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Introduction 
I have been asked to reºect on the signiªcance of the range of new visions 
of global public order now circulating in the United States, and to consider, 
in particular, what has happened to the liberal consensus of twenty years 
ago. There are, of course, many directions that a response might take. One 
could question whether there really was a liberal consensus twenty years ago 
and, if there was a seeming consensus, what underlying concerns and ten-
sions it attempted to mediate. One could focus on political science, econom-
ics, history, critical theory, postcolonial theory, or feminist theory and dis-
cuss how one or all of those has played a role in various challenges to liberal 
legal internationalism inside the United States. One could attempt to under-
stand liberal legal internationalism in relationship to U.S. foreign relations 
and question the extent to which it emerged and coalesced around a particu-
lar view of the United States’ role in the global order. One might consider 
what, if any, causal relationship exists between the dissolution of the appar-
ent consensus and the rise of what many consider to be a new American excep-
tionalism. And one might even consider whether liberal legal internationalism 
has unwittingly participated in constructing a new American exceptionalism. 
I will not explore all of these questions here. Yet I will attempt to touch 
upon many of them through the consideration of a couple of recent examples 
of the Bush administration’s deployment of international legal rhetoric and 
process to protect women’s rights, and by examining the various critiques 
they have and have not engendered. In particular, I will look at the Bush ad-
ministration’s intervention in Afghanistan and its support of international ef-
forts to end sex trafªcking. 
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I have chosen these case studies to understand contemporary views of in-
ternational law within the United Sates for a variety of reasons. Since September 
11, it seems that almost every international legal scholar in the United States 
has felt the need to write something about the war on terrorism, often speciª-
cally challenging or defending U.S. responses to September 11. As a result, it is 
more difªcult today than it has been for some time to separate visions of public 
order circulating within the United States from visions of public order about the 
United States. Moreover, with the rise of a real right within the discipline of 
international law in the United States over the past decade and its manifes-
tation in at least some of the Bush administration’s interpretations of inter-
national law, proponents and even designers of parts of the war against Iraq 
and the war on terrorism have effectively participated in and even altered the 
terms of much of the debate within the international legal academy. While 
liberal internationalists often contend that the Bush administration opposes 
international law, I would suggest instead that the administration is in many 
instances pursuing a vision of international law that does not accord with 
the liberal internationalist version that has dominated the past few decades. 
That is, the administration is often promoting a classical view of international 
law that is based on sovereign consent, at least on the sovereign consent of 
the United States. 
The case studies suggest, however, that the Bush administration policies 
also contain a liberal internationalist streak. With regard to Afghanistan, the 
administration has appealed to liberal internationalist and feminist rhetoric 
about respecting human rights. In the context of trafªcking, it has appealed 
to a liberal internationalist process that favors international cooperation. Thus, 
by offering examples where the United States claims to be protecting inter-
national human rights and even does so through a rhetorical, and in one in-
stance procedural, commitment to international cooperation, these case studies 
question the characterization of U.S. foreign policy as an example of Ameri-
can exceptionalism.1 In addition, they show how the assertion of acting in 
the name of international human rights, particularly women’s rights, serves 
to silence much of the opposition that the substantive positions themselves 
might otherwise invoke. 
I. The Bush Administration’s Promotion of Women’s 
Human Rights 
These are extraordinary times, historic times. We’ve seen the fall of bru-
tal tyrants. We’re seeing the rise of democracy in the Middle East. We’re 
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seeing women take their rightful place in societies that were once in-
credibly oppressive and closed. We’re seeing the power and appeal of lib-
erty in every single culture. And we’re proud once again—this nation is 
proud—to advance the cause of human rights and human freedom. 
                  —President George W. Bush, March 12, 2004, 
                    The White House2 
Global respect for women is a Bush Administration foreign policy pri-
ority. The United States is at the forefront of advancing women’s causes 
around the world, helping them become full participants in their socie-
ties through various initiatives and programs that help increase women’s 
political participation and economic opportunities and support for women 
and girls’ access to education and health care. 
                —State Department Ofªce of Senior Coordinator for 
                  International Women’s Issues3 
Many liberals are likely to disregard the above two quotations, consider-
ing them to be “mere rhetoric,” or even lies. In the wake of a nearly unilateral 
war against Iraq, the uncovering of torture in Abu Ghraib and at the U.S. mili-
tary base on Guantanamo, and State Department and Justice Department 
memoranda justifying both the war and torture, it is easy to conclude that the 
United States does not respect international human rights or international 
law—at least in their international cooperation forms—or care to advance their 
causes. 
In the shadow of the Bush administration’s refusal last October to join 
with 250 global leaders, including those of 85 states (including every European 
state) to sign a statement reafªrming the 1994 Cairo plan of action because 
of the statement’s reference to fundamental human rights including sexual 
and reproductive rights,4 it might be easy to conclude, as some have in similar 
cases, that the Bush administration is engaged in a “war against women.”5 
With these case studies, I hope to question the ease with which we can 
draw either conclusion, or assume that the President and his administration 
are lying when they claim to uphold international law and women’s human 
rights. I will point to some of the ways, beyond the two quotations above, 
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www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/opinion/12SUN1.html?ex=1112673600&en=9660648957a90039&ei= 
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that the Bush administration expresses a commitment to international law 
and to women’s human rights, and I will encourage us to take the rhetoric at 
face value. I want us to consider the rhetoric seriously because when we ask 
whether the administration is for or against international law and whether it 
is for or against women, liberal internationalists and feminists of all types 
miss an opportunity to engage with the substantive positions pursued by the 
administration. International law can be used and violated in the service of 
some women’s interests and vice versa. Rather than asking “are we for or against 
using international law to protect women’s rights?,” we might consider 
which rights of which women we want to protect, and in what ways interna-
tional law should be interpreted to protect them. 
The administration’s approach to Afghan women under the Taliban after 
September 11 and its approach to trafªcking both raise difªcult issues over 
which liberal internationalists and feminists disagree. To understand how the 
administration’s views have nevertheless largely gone unchallenged, I will 
set forth the administration’s positions, consider the liberal internationalist 
response, or lack thereof, and then layer over that some potential feminist 
reactions. I contend that in fact feminists are divided over issues that impli-
cate how Afghan women should be represented and in what ways they are in 
need of protection. They also differ over what they consider to be the harm 
constituted by trafªcking, and particularly over whether and how to distin-
guish prostitution from trafªcking. 
A. Afghanistan 
The recovery of Afghanistan must entail a restoration of the rights of Af-
ghan women. . . . The rights of women in Afghanistan will not be nego-
tiable. 
        —U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, November 19, 20016 
Only the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to pull out women’s ªnger- 
nails for wearing nail polish. The plight of women and children in Af-
ghanistan is a matter of deliberate human cruelty, carried out by those 
who seek to intimidate and control . . . because of our recent military gains 
in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. 
They can listen to music and teach their daughters without fear of pun-
ishment. 
                  —First Lady Laura Bush, November 17, 20017 
As of this month, [Afghanistan] has a new constitution, guaranteeing 
free elections and full participation by women. Businesses are opening, 
 
                                                                                                                      
6. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks at the Eisenhower Executive Ofªce Building (Nov. 19, 2001), 
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/6229.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). 
7. First Lady Laura Bush, Radio Address to the Nation (Nov. 17, 2001), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html. 
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health care centers are being established, and the boys and girls of Af-
ghanistan are back in school. 
         —President George W. Bush, State of the Union, 
          January 20, 20048 
When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taliban 
from leadership, it did so without explicit Security Council approval,9 and 
articulated two primary reasons for intervention. The ªrst was as a matter of 
self-defense, to hunt down Osama bin Laden for the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon. The second was to protect the women of Afghani-
stan.10 
In contrast to their nearly unanimous condemnation of the invasion of 
Iraq, liberal internationalists were somewhat divided over whether the United 
States could legally invade Afghanistan without explicit Security Council 
authorization. While international lawyers outside the United States tended 
to be critical of the U.S. position, some U.S. liberals were surprisingly sym-
pathetic to U.S. actions. Tom Franck, usually a critic of the administration, 
for example, wrote a piece in the American Journal of International Law de-
fending the United States against a group of German international lawyers 
who had been critical of the invasion.11 Only a few U.S. scholars were will-
ing to argue that the invasion was not justiªed as self-defense.12 
Even if the basis of the United States intervention in Afghanistan did not 
evoke much criticism, the occupation and ongoing intervention has not to-
tally escaped scrutiny by liberal internationalists. Yet such criticism tends to 
point to the Bush administration’s failure to commit seriously to its nation-
building project. As Harold Koh puts it, “the problem in Afghanistan has 
not been what the United States had done, but what it has not yet done. The 
United States won the Afghan war, without making the necessary commit-
ments to secure the peace.”13 Thus, the question becomes not whether the 
 
                                                                                                                      
8. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
9. There is a debate over whether Security Council Resolution 1368, which was passed on September 
12, 2001 and “[r]ecogniz[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance 
with the Charter,” provided such authorization. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
See, e.g., infra notes 11, 12, 43. 
10. See, e.g., Interview by Noah Adams of National Public Radio with Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of 
State, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/ 
remarks/2001/5091.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (stating that “[the Taliban leadership] has impover-
ished the country; it has suppressed fundamental human rights in a most vicious way, especially the 
rights of women”). 
11. Thomas M. Franck, Editorial Comments: Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 
839 (2001). See also Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States (Mar. 31, 2003), at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing1/witness_ 
sofaer.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) (stating that Resolution 1368 implicitly authorized the use of 
force by the United States). 
12. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 533 (2002). 
13. Koh, supra note 1, at 1490. 
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United States has pursued a liberal internationalist agenda, but whether it 
has pursued it strongly enough. 
Regardless of the position they took or continue to take on the invasion of 
Afghanistan, liberal internationalists in the United States rarely relied upon 
arguments about women’s rights in their defense or critique of the Bush ad-
ministration’s actions. It would have been difªcult, at least within the tradi-
tional understanding of humanitarian intervention, to justify the invasion of 
another country to protect women’s rights, especially in the absence of ex-
plicit Security Council approval. 
Yet, to the extent that the administration justiªed and the public under-
stood the invasion as a means to protect women from the Taliban, one might 
have expected that it would have been a dream for many feminists. Legally 
or not, “the troops” were actually being sent in to protect women. Women’s 
rights groups, both inside and outside Afghanistan, had long been trying to 
call attention to the plight women had suffered in Afghanistan, but especially 
since the Taliban had seized control. At last, it would seem they were being 
heard. Moreover, radical feminists had long critiqued international law for 
its structural failure to attend to women’s rights, arguing that international 
law had failed to hold states accountable for private and public violence against 
women, either as a doctrinal or practical matter. Enforcement mechanisms 
were seen as weak or non-existent. The invasion of a country to protect women’s 
rights would seem to be a way to enforce the doctrine that did exist. 
It turned out that Western feminists did not overwhelmingly applaud the 
administration’s actions. Nor did they strongly criticize them. Instead, Western 
feminists were mostly silent with regard to the intervention in Afghanistan.14 
Most had opposed the Bush administration in general, but suddenly found 
themselves in the position of having to decide between supporting the war 
and opposing the rights of Afghan women. There was little room to second-
guess the dichotomy. 
And feminists have largely remained silent. Indeed, as recently as 2004, 
the Global Scorecard for Women gave the Bush administration an A for rheto-
ric but a D for action with regard to women in Afghanistan, explaining: 
With pledges of support for the constitutional rights of women, expan-
sion of international peace troops and more reconstruction aid, the Ad-
ministration’s rhetoric is strong. But extremist interpretations of Islam 
continue to threaten women’s rights, few new peace troops have been 
deployed, and little additional money has reached Afghanistan.15 
 
                                                                                                                      
14. For a critique of the left’s failure to “grasp the discourse about women from the right” in this con-
text, see Ranjana Khanna, Taking a stand for Afghanistan: Women and the Left, 28 Signs 464 (2002).  
15. Center for Health and Gender Equity, Feminist Majority, and Women’s Environment and Devel-
opment Organization, Global Women’s Issues Scorecard on the Bush Administration, available at 
http://www.wglobalscorecard.org/Mar04Afghanistan.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). 
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Others have commented on how fundamentalism has retained its power since 
the invasion. The concern, then, is much like that expressed by Harold Koh 
from the liberal internationalist perspective. It is not that the administration 
intervened, but that it did not intervene enough in the end to wipe out fun-
damentalism. 
Had feminists engaged with the question of whether international law 
should support an invasion to protect women’s rights, they almost certainly 
would have differed in their responses. Liberal, or doctrinal, feminists might, 
for example, have been aligned with those skeptical liberal internationalists, 
mostly from outside the United States. Attentive to violations of women’s hu-
man rights under the Taliban, these feminists might nevertheless have ar-
gued that military action against Afghanistan should only be taken collec-
tively under the U.N. Charter. Perhaps international law needed changing, 
but changes in the law—not unilateral force—should be the answer. Cultural 
feminists might have questioned whether violence should be used to end 
violence, or whether attempts at peaceful resolution might have been more 
in line with feminist values. 
In the decade preceding September 11, Third World feminists, including 
many in the United States, had been engaged in a critique, both of interna-
tional law and of Western feminist critiques of international law, largely 
challenging First World feminist understanding and use of culture to call for 
changes in women’s lives in the third world.16 For these critics, First World 
feminists often essentialized culture and deªned Third World women by 
that essentialized culture. In doing so, First World feminists were seen to deny 
Third World women’s agency within or in opposition to their “culture.” 
Ratna Kapur provides an example of this critique applied speciªcally to 
approaches to women’s rights in Afghanistan. First, she points to the ways in 
which Western feminists have described women’s plight under the Taliban: 
The West has almost obsessively focused on the veil as a symbol of the 
Taliban’s discriminatory treatment of women. To “Westerners” the burqa is 
a “kind of body bag for the living.” This practice is being evaluated 
against the rhetoric of (Western, Christian) civilization, respect for 
women as deªned by ªrst wives Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, and femi-
nist claims to “rescue” Muslim women from their “barbaric” culture.17 
She then argues that such descriptions essentialize and freeze Islamic culture: 
 
                                                                                                                      
16. For an elaboration of this literature, as well as a description of what I mean by Third World femi-
nism (as distinct from feminism in the third world), see Karen Engle, International Human Rights and 
Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting, in Feminist Perspectives on International Law (Dorris 
Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., forthcoming 2005).  
17. Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women’s Rights in the “War on Terrorism,” 9 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 
211, 216 (2002). 
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[T]his stagnant understanding of culture as well as the criteria being 
developed to distinguish the “good” Muslim from the “bad” Muslim 
does not acknowledge the dissents, pluralisms or contests over the mean-
ing of culture and religions. It does not . . . reºect the complexity of 
culture within Islam and the Islamic world.18 
While this critique of the essentialization of culture is often made in a vari-
ety of contexts, it has not been commonly voiced around the issue of Af-
ghanistan. To the extent that feminists have been critical of the U.S. position on 
Afghanistan, they have generally assumed that fundamentalist culture is the 
central problem to be addressed, and that the United States simply has not 
done enough to help women in this regard. 
B. Trafªcking 
My Administration also has advanced the ªght against human trafªcking 
and the abuse and exploitation of women and children, particularly of 
young girls in the sex trade. 
               —President George W. Bush, Dec. 10, 2004 
           (Human Rights Day)19 
Worldwide, violence against children continued to be a problem and 
trafªcking in persons claimed many women and children as victims, forced 
to engage in sex acts or to labor under conditions comparable to slavery. 
                —U.S. State Department Country Reports, 2003. 
                  Released Feb. 200420 
In FY 2003, the U.S. devoted nearly $93.5 million to combat trafªcking 
in persons worldwide. At the 2003 UN General Assembly, President 
Bush committed an additional $50 million to accelerate efforts to res-
cue women and children from labor and commercial sex exploitation. 
               —State Department ofªce of Senior Coordinator for 
                 International Women’s Issues, Oct. 5, 200421 
The United States has signed two U.N. Protocols on trafªcking: the U.N. 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafªcking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children22 and the U.N. Protocol to the Convention on the 
 
                                                                                                                      
18. Id. 
19. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights Day, and Human 
Rights Week, 2004 (Dec. 10, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/ 
20041210-17.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
20. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 (Feb. 
25, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/29637.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
21. Ofªce of the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues, Fact Sheet: U.S. International 
Women’s Issues Initiatives (Jan. 19, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/40996.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 
2005). 
22. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafªcking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Annex II, G.A. 
Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Dec. 12, 2000). 
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Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography.23 In addition, the United States has ratiªed International La-
bor Organization Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immedi-
ate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour.24 The 
administration has encouraged additional signatures to these instruments and 
has, in statements made to the Committee on the Advancement of Women, 
“welcome[d] new partnerships in combating the scourge of trafªcking.”25 In 
addition, the Bush Administration has supported municipal legislation to 
combat trafªcking, signing the Victims of Trafªcking and Violence Protec-
tion Act of 2000.26 That legislation contains measures designed to prevent 
trafªcking, prosecute trafªckers, and protect victims, and establishes a Cabi-
net-level federal inter-agency task force to monitor and combat trafªcking.27 
In accordance with that legislation, the U.S. government has begun rating 
other countries’ records on human trafªcking and, in principle, can impose eco-
nomic sanctions on any country that does not take steps to end the practice.28 
For a liberal internationalist, this type of response to a global problem would 
seem ideal. International cooperation is being used to develop protocols, and 
would seem to be the accepted means by which to end trafªcking. Further, the 
state is committing itself to the enforcement of international law through 
municipal legislation. 
For many feminists, this response to trafªcking would also appear to be ideal. 
Liberal and radical feminists, at least, might be pleased to see international 
law being used to respond to a longtime concern—the exploitation of women’s 
sexuality. 
In fact, though, liberals and feminists have long been divided over issues 
of trafªcking, particularly on whether prostitution should be included in an 
anti-trafªcking sweep. Radical feminists like Kathleen Barry and Catharine 
MacKinnon have long questioned the distinction between forced trafªcking 
and prostitution,29 arguing in part that, like forced trafªcking, prostitution 
does not represent a choice, but constitutes economic and physical coercion. 
 
                                                                                                                      
23. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Pornography, and Child Prostitution, G.A. Res. 54/263, Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000). 
24. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination 
of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, ILO Convention No. 182, available at http:// 
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/ratiªcation/convention/text.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).  
25. Press Release, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Statement by Nancy Cain Marcus, United 
States Public Delegate to the United Nations on the Advancement of Women and Implementation of the 
Outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women and the Twenty-third Special Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly, in the Third Committee, General Assembly (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un. 
int/usa/01_145.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). 
26. Victims of Trafªcking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 
(2000), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10492.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). 
27. Id. at §§ 105–07, 112. 
28. Id. at § 110.  
29. See, e.g., Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitu-
tion and Civil Rights, 1 Mich. J. Gender L. 13–31 (1993). 
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Others who resist the distinction sometimes argue that prostitution creates 
the black market that facilitates trafªcking. 
With regard to prostitution more generally, however, other feminists have 
argued that women should have the right to commodify their bodies, and 
have challenged the distinctions critics often assume between prostitution 
and many other forms of work that women do. Indeed, some prostitute advo-
cacy groups argue that prostitution provides women a unique form of 
agency.30 Many liberals and most libertarians are generally inclined to agree 
that women should be granted some amount of autonomy to use their bodies 
for purposes of prostitution. With regard to the speciªc relationship between 
prostitution and trafªcking, some feminists—generally from outside the 
United States—have argued that anti-trafªcking measures, if unwittingly, harm 
women because they are used to prevent the migration of women for pur-
poses of labor, as well as to punish sex workers.31 
In its anti-trafªcking campaign, the Bush administration has taken an ex-
plicit anti-prostitution position, effectively joining with radical feminists 
and the religious right.32 Beyond using anti-trafªcking efforts to attempt to 
end prostitution, the State Department recently announced that “no U.S. grant 
funds should be awarded to foreign non-governmental organizations that 
support legal state-regulated prostitution.”33 Thus, the $50 million it has 
earmarked for anti-trafªcking efforts this year to enforce its anti-prostitution 
position will only be awarded to nongovernmental organizations that ac-
tively oppose prostitution.34 The administration justiªed this move by argu-
ing that “[p]rostitution and related activities—including pimping and pa-
tronizing or maintaining brothels—fuel the growth of modern-day slavery 
by providing a façade behind which trafªckers for sexual exploitation oper-
ate” and that “prostitution is the oldest form of oppression.”35 
To the extent that feminists have criticized the administration, they have 
not done so by defending the rights of prostitutes or by raising substantive 
concerns about the effects of aiming enforcement efforts against them. Rather, 
they have generally responded from a pragmatic perspective, arguing that 
 
                                                                                                                      
30. For these arguments, as well as an excellent description of the debate between sex workers and 
their critics, see Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unªnished Draft), 105 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1045, 1052–59 (1992).  
31. See, e.g., Marieke van Doorninck & Marjan Wijers, Only Rights Can Stop Wrongs: A Critical As-
sessment of Anti-Trafªcking Strategies (paper presented at EU/IOM STOP European Conference on 
Preventing and Combating Trafªcking in Human Beings—A Global Challenge for the 21st Century) 
(Sept. 18–20, 2002), available at http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/wijers-rights.html (last visited Apr. 
25, 2005). 
32. For a discussion of the inºuence that evangelical Christians have had on the Bush administration’s 
anti-trafªcking positions, see Elisabeth Bumiller, Evangelicals Sway White House On Human Rights Issues 
Abroad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2003, at A11. 
33. U.S. Bureau of Public Affairs, The Link Between Prostitution and Sex Trafªcking 2 
(2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/38790.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). 
34. Jennifer Friedlin, Debate Roars Over Anti-Trafªcking Funds, Feminist.com, at http://www.feminist. 
com/news/vaw14.html (Apr. 17, 2004) (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). 
35. U.S. Bureau of Public Affairs, supra note 33. 
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directing government funding only to groups that oppose prostitution will 
hurt organizations that provide services to prostitutes but have not taken an 
anti-prostitution position.36 These critics further warn that by turning the war 
on trafªcking into a battle against prostitution, the government’s anti-trafªck-
ing efforts will prove ineffective.37 Thus, much as feminists and liberal in-
ternationalists found fault with the invasion of Afghanistan for its lack of 
success, not its aim, here the claim is that Bush administration’s attempts to 
end trafªcking will be ineffective because they will prevent assistance to 
groups that might otherwise be helpful in reducing trafªcking. 
Executive director of Equality Now Taina Bien-Aime has been perhaps a 
bit more critical than most feminists in the United States with regard to the 
Bush administration’s trafªcking policy, saying she is concerned that it will 
keep money from non-governmental organizations that help women who 
turn to prostitution out of desperation in much the same way that the ad-
ministration has used what is known as the global gag rule to keep money 
from any non-governmental organization (NGO) that discusses abortion. “If 
people are trying to unionize women in prostitution, is that pro-prostitution?” 
Bien-Aime asked. “We don’t want a situation like the global gag rule where 
people are punished because they address prostitution.”38 Ultimately, though, 
even this level of critique has been muted. The day after a story containing 
the above quotation was published, for example, a clariªcation was posted: “The 
quote above from Taina Bien-Aime, executive director of Equality Now, did 
not make clear that Equality Now opposes the legalization and unionization 
of prostitution in any form, all of which, the organization says, fuels the de-
mand for trafªcking of women and girls.”39 
Thus, despite the fact that liberals and a variety of feminists have argued 
against anti-prostitution efforts and even some anti-trafªcking efforts in other 
contexts, the criticisms have rarely been articulated in the context of the 
Bush administration’s anti-trafªcking policies. The administration’s seeming 
commitment to women and international law on this issue, I would con-
tend, has largely led to self-censorship on the part of would-be critics. In 
fairness, though, I should note that there is another practical reason for the 
lack of criticism. If funds to oppose trafªcking will only go to organizations 
that oppose prostitution, even nongovernmental organizations in the United 
States have been compromised. As one commentator has explained: “U.S.-
based organizations that currently receive either antitrafªcking or HIV-
related funding and might want to resist or challenge the expanded interpre-
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tation of the law on both constitutional and programmatic grounds—including 
major universities as well as private health and development groups—will 
run the risk of being labeled as ‘pro-prostitution.’”40 
II. Conclusion: The End of the Liberal Consensus? 
Since 1990, much of the work of international legal scholarship in the United 
States has tended toward either left or right critiques.41 Identity politics and 
reassertions of Third World sovereignty have dominated the left. Renewed ar-
guments about sovereign autonomy—at least with regard to the United States 
and the exceptional nature of its constitutional democracy—have comprised 
most of the critiques of the right.42 
In this telling, the center in the discipline is constantly under attack in a 
way it has not been in decades—from within the discipline itself. Interna-
tional lawyers are no longer able to attend the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law (ASIL) with the assurance that they will be 
surrounded by other believers of the faith, even as they unite together to ªght 
the actions of U.S. administrations or people outside of the ªeld who reject 
international law’s legitimacy. If liberal internationalism continues to domi-
nate the ASIL, the argument would be that it does so by a combination of de-
sign and self-selection. Many international legal thinkers, on the left at least, 
feel that the ASIL considers them as nothing more than tokens.43 
In another telling, though, international legal vocabulary continues to domi-
nate both the academy and international legal practice, even in the United 
States. The center, left, and right all at some level default to it when making 
their claims. Those who assert Third World sovereignty, for example, also argue 
for respect for universal human rights, if primarily of the economic and so-
cial variety, and those who argue that the United States needs to use its sov-
ereignty to protect the Constitution also argue for international cooperation 
to protect universal human rights—even women’s rights. 
My intervention here has in part been to show ways in which international 
legal liberalism is, in form and discourse, still very much alive. Indeed, the 
rhetoric is so alive that it has functioned to prevent substantive critiques by 
international legal liberalists themselves, whether of the feminist or non-femi-
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nist type. Both case studies offer instances of where the Bush administration 
has invoked—not ignored—international law, although I would maintain that 
even in other, more overtly contested areas, the administration has consis-
tently interpreted rather than disregarded international law.44 Still, it seems 
likely that its positions on women’s human rights have been less controver-
sial than torture or war, in part because the administration has deployed both 
feminist and liberal internationalist arguments to shore up its policies. I con-
tend that the lack of controversy engendered by the policies is part of the 
problem. Liberal internationalist discourse and even liberal and radical feminist 
discourse have been, it seems, effectively captured by the right. 
I hope I have made clear that I believe that both positions of the admini-
stration are problematic. The invasion of Afghanistan is problematic, even from 
a liberal internationalist position. I suspect, however, that many liberal interna-
tionalists were willing to grant the Executive a signiªcant amount of leeway 
in responding to September 11, at least in part because of the way that gender 
was deployed in the discourse—through images of liberating uneducated, cor-
porally punished, burqa-clad women. But both Afghanistan and trafªcking also 
raise issues for feminists. The extent to which the intervention in Afghanistan 
was justiªed as a move to save Afghan women from the Taliban, for example, 
raises questions about the representations of culture with regard to Afghani-
stan in general and Afghan women in particular, the extent to which those 
representations should be and are already contested, and the extent to which 
“saving” women has functioned to deºect attention from the ongoing eco-
nomic and political harm caused to the region by the war. The restrictions on 
trafªcking raise questions about the representations of women with regard to 
trafªcking, whether women should be able to sell their sexuality both here 
and abroad, and the extent to which anti-trafªcking efforts function to restrict 
migration and avert attention from the socioeconomic pressures that make 
women and children vulnerable to trafªcking. 
If liberal internationalists and feminists are suppressing their substantive 
disagreements for the purposes of promoting international law or women (or 
both), it is almost certain to backªre. The suppression of that disagreement 
takes an administration that most of us do not trust for other reasons, and defers 
to it both to make international law and to deªne women’s human rights. Para-
doxically, such procedural deference highlights the extent to which interna-
tional legal liberalists and feminists might ultimately be participating in the 
demise of the dominance of their own substantive views about global order. 
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